State v. Clinton Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 38755 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-24-2011
State v. Clinton Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38755
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Clinton Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38755" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 532.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/532
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 












BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE DEBORAH A. BAIL 
District Judge 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
SARA B. THOMAS 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 8210 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................... 5 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 6 
I. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Acted In Manifest 
Disregard of I.C.R. 32 and I.C. § 19-2522, When It Failed To 
Sua Sponte Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of Mr. Clinton 
Prior To Sentencing ............................................................................. 6 
A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 6 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Acted In Manifest 
Disregard of I.C.R. 21 and I.C. § 19-2522, When It Failed To 
Sua Sponte Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of Mr. Clinton 
Prior To Sentencing ........................................................................ 7 
II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A 
Unified Sentence Of Twenty Years, With Three Years Fixed, 
Upon Mr. Clinton Following His Plea Of Guilty To Lewd 
Conduct With A Minor Under Sixteen ................................................. 16 
A. Introduction .............................................................................. 16 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Twenty Years, With 
Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Clinton Following His 
Plea Of Guilty To Lewd Conduct With A Minor 
Under Sixteen .......................................................................... 16 
CONCLUSiON .................................................................................................... 20 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 21 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
State v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408 (Ct. App. 2007) .................................................... 7 
State v. Coonts, 137 Idaho 150 (Ct. App. 2002) ................................................... 8 
State v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188 (Ct. App. 2002) ................................................... 8 
State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876 (Ct. App. 1994) ............................................. 8 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593 (1982) ............................................................. 18 
Statues 
I.C. § 18-215 ........................................................................................ 3 
I.C. § 19-2522 ......................................................................... 1,5-8,12-15 
Rules 
I.C.R.32 ............................................................................................... 3 
I.C.R.35 ............................................................................................... 4 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joseph Richard Clinton timely appeals from the district court's Judgment and 
Commitment, wherein the district court imposed and executed a unified sentence of 
twenty years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Clinton for his guilty plea to lewd conduct 
with a minor under sixteen. On appeal, Mr. Clinton argues that the district court abused 
its discretion and acted in manifest disregard of the pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and 
the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, when it failed to sua sponte order a mental health 
evaluation of Mr. Clinton prior to sentencing. Alternatively, Mr. Clinton argues that the 
district court imposed and executed an excessive sentence in light of Mr. Clinton's 
mental health issues. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Clinton was indicted for lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. 
(R., pp.24-25.) Mr. Clinton was initially deemed incompetent to stand trial and his trial 
counsel moved the district court to commit Mr. Clinton. (R., ppA7-48.) Mr. Clinton was 
reassessed and deemed competent to stand trial. (Tr., p.6, Ls.12-14.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Clinton pleaded guilty to lewd conduct with a 
minor under the age of sixteen. (Tr., p.11, LsA-9.) In return, the State agreed to 
recommend a twenty five year sentence and either probation or a period of retained 
jurisdiction, if Mr. Clinton's psychosexual evaluation indicated he was amenable to 
treatment. (Tr., p.11, L.14 - p.13, L.6.) Mr. Clinton's trial counsel clarified that, "even if 
he comes back a high risk to reoffend but amenable to treatment, this plea agreement is 
still in place." (Tr., p.13, Ls.3-6.) 
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At the change of plea hearing, a substitute attorney represented Mr. Clinton. 
(Tr., p.10, Ls.7 -20.) That attorney began the hearing by stated, "Your Honor, at this 
point Mr. Clinton does not even know who I am." (Tr., p.1 0, Ls.7-S.) Trial counsel went 
on to note that, "My client is getting on in years, an older gentleman, suffering from 
some - - it looks like some onset of dementia. . ." (T., p.11, Ls.20-22.) Then 
following dialogue occurred during the plea colloquy: 
Q. Has - - Well, are you pleading guilty even though you think you are 
innocent? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. You are pleading guilty? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think you are innocent of this crime? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. We will have to talk more about that. 
Mr. Geddes: Do you believe that you are innocent of this charge? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
Mr. Geddes: Do you believe you are guilty of the crime? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
(Tr., p.21, L.13 - p.22, L.3.) The colloquy continued as follows: 
Q. Okay. So you want to plead guilty. You know what rights you are 
giving up, and you have thought about it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So what happened? 
A. (no audible response.) 
Q. Did - - What happened here? Why are you guilty? 
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A. What now? 
(Tr., p.30, Ls.10-18.) Thereafter, the district court accepted Mr. Clinton's guilty plea, 
and stated that the defendant would be able to withdraw his guilty plea at any time up to 
sentencing. (Tr., p.33, Ls.9-17.) The district court then entered its order for a 
psychosexual evaluation, and Mr. Clinton's trial counsel stipulated that his competency 
evaluations could be used in the psychosexual evaluation. 1 (R., pp.65-66; Tr., p.34, 
L.22 - p.35, L.18.) 
The psychosexual evaluation noted that Mr. Clinton "did not remember when he 
was arrested or how long he has been in jail." (Presentence Interview Report 
(hereinafter "PSI"), p.15l During the presentence interview, Mr. Clinton asked the 
presentence investigator with help reinstating his social security. (PSI, p.9.) 
At sentencing, Mr. Clinton had a new attorney that did not know the terms of the 
plea agreement, and his attorney had to ask the district court what they were. (Tr., 
p.37, Ls.10-16.) The psychosexual evaluation indicated that Mr. Clinton was a high risk 
to reoffend, but was amenable to treatment and willing to be involved in treatment. (Tr., 
p.43, Ls.15-23.) Moreover, the evaluation indicated that Mr. Clinton had a great deal of 
difficulty understanding the sexual terms and questions being asked of him during the 
psychosexual interview. (PSI, p.19.) 
1 The use of Mr. Clinton's competency evaluations in the presentence process 
constituted a violation of his 5th Amendment rights against compelled self-incrimination 
and is in direct contravention of the express contained in I.C. § 18-215. See State v. 
Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817,820-822 (2010); State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,499 (2006). 
Since trial counsel waived these protections for Mr. Clinton, this issue will not be 
addressed on appeal. 
2 The electronic version of the PSI contains various attachments. For ease of citation, 
this brief will adhere to the pagination contained in the electronic format, which begins 
with the cover of the January 28, 2011, PSI and ends on page 271. 
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At sentencing, Mr. Clinton's mental health was also discussed at length. 
According to the State, Mr. Clinton has numerous mental health issues, an I.Q. of 74, 
profound hearing loss, and is illiterate. (Tr., p.43, Ls.9-11.) The district court refused to 
place Mr. Clinton on probation or offer him a period of retained jurisdiction based on its 
conclusion that Mr. Clinton's dementia reduces his ability to control his sexual impulses. 
perceived between his mental health and his sexual behaviors. (Tr., p.51, l.11 - p.53, 
L. 23.) Thereafter, the district court imposed and executed a unified sentence of twenty 
years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.68-69.) Mr. Clinton timely appealed. (R., pp.71-
73.) 
Mr. Clinton timely filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, which was denied by the district 
court. 3 (R., pp.75.) Thereafter, Mr. Clinton filed another I.C.R. 35 motion.4 
3 Mr. Clinton did not provide any new or additional information in support of his I.C.R. 35 
motion, which is required for appellate review. See State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201 
(2007). Accordingly, Mr. Clinton is not raising the district court's denial of his I.C.R. 35 
motion as an issue on appeal. Additionally, the district court's order denying 
Mr. Clinton's I.C.R. 35 motion was not included in the record on appeal, so a motion to 
augment the record has been filed concurrently herewith. 
4 Only one motion requesting a leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35 can be filed in an action. 
Accordingly, the district court's denial of Mr. Clinton's second I.C.R. 35 motion will not 
be addressed as an issue on appeal. Additionally, the documents relating to 
Mr. Clinton's second I.C.R. 35 motion were not included in the record on appeal, so a 
motion to augment the record has been filed concurrently herewith. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion and act in manifest disregard for the 
pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, when it 
failed to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Clinton prior to 
sentencing? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
twenty years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Clinton following his plea of guilty 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Acted In Manifest Disregard of I.C.R. 32 
and I.C. § 19-2522, When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of 
Mr. Clinton Prior To Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Clinton suffers from severe mental health problems, which are distinctly 
different from his sexual behavior. His mental health issues were so manifest, he was 
initially deemed incompetent to stand for trial. He still appeared to be confused at the 
change of plea hearing. Despite these clear signals, the district court only ordered a 
psychosexual evaluation and failed to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. 
§ 19-2522. 
Mr. Clinton had a plea agreement in place where he would receive probation or a 
period of retained jurisdiction if his psychosexual evaluation deemed him amenable to 
rehabilitation, which it did. However, the district court refused to honor the plea 
agreement and Mr. Clinton's request for probation or a period of retained jurisdiction 
based solely on Mr. Clinton's "dementia," and the perceived negative impact it would 
have on his amenability to treatment. In other words, the district court treated 
Mr. Clinton's mental health as the most significant factor at sentencing, where it was 
used as the justification to deny him the benefit of his plea agreement. However, the 
extent of his dementia and the role it should play in sentencing was never fully 
examined and articulated in a mental health evaluation. Therefore, the district court 
manifestly disregarded the relevant portions of I.C.R. 32 and I.C. § 19-2522 when it 
failed to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. 
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Acted In Manifest Disregard of 
I.C.R. 32 and I.C. § 19-2522, When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A Mental 
Health Evaluation Of Mr. Clinton Prior To Sentencing 
According to I.C. §19-2522: 
(1) If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will 
be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court 
shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to 
examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant. 
(3) The report of the examination shall include the following: 
(a) A description of the nature of the examination; 
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of 
the defendant; 
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect 
and level of functional impairment; 
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the 
defendant's mental condition; 
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or 
nontreatment; 
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may 
create for the public if at large. 
"The requirements of I.C. § 19-2522 are complimented by Idaho Criminal Rule 
32 which specifies the elements to be included in the presentence report. These 
elements include information on the health of the defendant where relevant to the 
sentencing decision, I.C.R. 32(b)(8), and, where appropriate, the presentence 
investigator's analysis and recommendation regarding a psychological examination, 
I.C.R. 32(b)(10)." State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817,822 (2010). 
The decision whether to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2522 is discretionary with the district court. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408, 
409 (Ct. App. 2007). However, as with any exercise of discretion, the district court's 
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determination must be consistent with applicable legal standards. State v. Coonts, 137 
Idaho 150, 152 (Ct. App. 2002). "The legal standards governing the court's decision 
whether to order a psychological evaluation and report are contained in I.C. § 19-2522." 
Collins, 144 Idaho at 409. Idaho Code § 19-2522 provides that a mental health 
evaluation is mandatory, rather than discretionary, if there is reason to believe that the 
mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good 
cause shown. Coonts, 137 Idaho at 152; State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879 (Ct. 
App. 1994). This Court will uphold the failure of the district court to order a mental 
health evaluation if the record supports the finding that there was no reason to believe 
that the defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing or if the 
information already before the district court meets the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. 
State v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2002). "Where a defendant did not 
request a psychological evaluation or object to the absence of such an evaluation in the 
PSI, the defendant must demonstrate that by failing to order such an evaluation the 
sentencing court manifestly disregarded the provisions of I.C.R. 32." Jockumsen, 148, 
Idaho at 822 (citations omitted). 
In this case, the record is replete with signals that Mr. Clinton suffered from 
severe mental health issues. As previously stated, Mr. Clinton appeared to be confused 
during the change of plea hearing. (Tr., p.21, L.13 - p.22, L.3; Tr., p.30, L.10 - p.33, 
L.17.) Mr. Clinton's first competency evaluation contained the following: 
Because he is not particularly good historian and I do not have any prior 
medical records, it is difficult to determine what the source of his 
neurocognitive difficulties would be. Certainly, I would consider whether 
or not he may have either a primary dementia such as an Alzheimer's 
type, or whether or not he may in fact have some type of cerebrovascular 
disease (Le., stroke, multiinfarct dementia, etc.). However, there is really 
no good information regarding this at this time. 
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Psychologically, he presents as significantly depressed despite his 
minimization of this. 
(08/30/10 Competency Evaluation, p.?) The competency evaluator then concluded "I 
have substantial reservations about his competency to proceed as defined by Idaho 
Code 18-211." (08/30/10 Competency Evaluation, p.?) 
The competency evaluator noted the following about restoring Mr. Clinton's 
competency: 
Obviously, obtaining prior medical records related to Mr. Clinton would be 
beneficial in further trying to understand what, if any, medical condition he 
may have that is causing these difficulties. However, in my opinion, 
Mr. Clinton needs a comprehensive neurological evaluation to further 
assist us in understanding his mental status, and in particular, the etiology 
of his cognitive difficulties. Depending upon the outcome of a 
comprehensive neurological evaluation, there may in fact be treatment 
options to improve his cognitive functioning and to help him towards 
competence to proceed in his legal affairs. 
(08/30/10 Competency Evaluation, p.8) (emphasis added). 
Mr. Clinton never received the comprehensive mental health evaluation which 
was deemed necessary in the first competency evaluation. However, his competency 
to stand trial was reviewed a second time. In the second competency evaluation, the 
competency evaluator was provided with a video tape of Mr. Clinton's interview with 
detectives and the "polygrapher," and audio copies of phone calls between Mr. Clinton 
and his friends from the trailer park. (10/13/10 Competency Evaluation, p.2.) This 
evaluation ultimately deemed Mr. Clinton competent to stand trial. (10/13/10 
Competency Evaluation, p.4.) In coming to that conclusion, the following observations 
were made: 
It is apparent, and it was also noted in my evaluation, that he is 
experiencing a significant amount of emotional distress. This appears to 
be increaSing, as his legal affair case moves forward. His level of 
depression/anxiety does create difficulties in his effectiveness in 
interacting. This may be a significant factor also in his appearance of 
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confusion during my examination. Therefore, I cannot rule out a primary 
dementia with Mr. Clinton, but the severity of that possible dementia 
appears to be much less than I had originally suspected. He does 
continue to experience a significant amount of emotional distress 
characterized predominately as an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety 
and depressed mood. 
(10/13/10 Competency Evaluation, p.3.) The evaluation went on to state: 
Mr. Clinton does present as experiencing increasing emotional distress 
characterized by anxiety and depression. Given his low average 
intellectual abilities and other factors, this has the potential of having an 
increasing effect on his ability to effectively communicate with legal 
counsel and interact with the court appropriately .... 1 would strongly 
recommend he be seen and evaluated by the mental health staff at the 
Ada County Jail for possible antidepressant or anxiety type medication. 
Treating his increasingly emotional distress would also be an important 
factor in Mr. Clinton's abilities to communicate and assist in his defense. 
(10/13/10 Competency Evaluation, p.5.) Even though Mr. Clinton was deemed 
competent to stand trial, his possible dementia was not ruled out. Further, Mr. Clinton's 
emotional distress was so severe that it was inhibiting his ability to assist his counsel in 
his defense. 
Additionally, the psychosexual evaluation contained signals that Mr. Clinton 
suffered from severe mental health issues. The psychosexual evaluator noted that 
while Mr. Clinton "signed the forms for release of information and had payment 
responsibilities read to him[,] it is unclear if he understood fully what he was signing." 
(PSI, p.20.) The psychosexual evaluator went on to note: 
The following psychological test were attempted to be administered but 
because of what appeared to be low intellectual functioning of the 
examinee, his capacity to comprehend the tests were minimal and, 
consequently, they were unable to produce valid results. 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) 
Multiphasic Sex Inventory-II (MSI-II) 
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAl) 
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(PSI, p.24.) The DSM -IV diagnosis concluded that there was not enough information 
to offer a diagnosis of his personality issues. (PSI, p.25.) It also stated that his 
impairment might be at the level of mental retardation range. (PSI, p.25) 
Mr. Clinton's mental health was not only a significant factor at sentencing, but it 
was also the determinative factor precluding him from receiving the benefit of his plea 
bargain. At sentencing the State indicated that Mr. Clinton, "has numerous mental 
issues and an I.Q. of 74, a [sic] profound hearing loss, illiteracy, [and] cannot read or 
write .... " (Tr., p.43, Ls.9-11.) The district court stated: 
[W]hat we have right now is a very serious issue that the defendant is 
suffering from dementia, which will probably worsen his ability to 
understand and internalize additional counseling. If the prior counseling 
was successful ... that success appears to be dimming now. 
Unfortunately, I think this is a very risky picture. It really looks like possibly 
the emerging dementia, coupled with the pedophiliac disposition, is just - -
is at a worsening place, and that's what would be my assessment, based 
on what's before me. And that, at best, he would have to start treatment 
in a secure facility. 
It is not clear if the treatment can be successful, based upon his 
deteriorating condition. 
And besides which I think his abilities to control his impulses, which never 
was as strong as some people with sturdier intellectual gifts, but is 
appears that he was able to control his impulses. 
I'm afraid that what's going on for whatever reason appears to be 
lessening his ability to control his impulses. 
(Tr., p.51, L.11 - p.52, L.15.) The district court went on to state: 
Unfortunately, sexual impulses tend to survive dementia. They tend to be 
whatever they were before the dementia process began, so I think, 
unfortunately, the risk in this case is quite high, and the practical solutions 
are non-existent. 5 
5 The preceding block quote contains various factual findings which are clearly 
erroneous because they are type which would require an expert's opinion. For 
example, "it is not clear that treatment can be successful, based upon his deteriorating 
condition," (Tr., p.51, L.25-p.52, L.2.), "Unfortunately, sexual impulses tend to survive 
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(Tr., p.53, Ls.1S-23.) There never was an official prognosis that Mr. Clinton suffered 
from dementia. However, the district court relied almost exclusively on Mr. Clinton's 
dementia and the impact it has on his sexual behavior when determining his sentence. 
The information before the district court at sentencing does not function as an 
adequate substitute for an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation. As stated above, the first 
competency evaluation stated that there was "really no good information regarding" 
Mr. Clinton's dementia at the time of the evaluation, and that Mr. Clinton needed a 
"comprehensive neurological evaluation to further assist us in understanding his mental 
status, and in particular, the etiology of his cognitive difficulties." (OS/30/10 
Competency Evaluation, p.7-S.) The competency evaluator also stated that he did not 
have Mr. Clinton's medical records and that they would help in diagnosing Mr. Clinton's 
dementia. (OS/30/10 Competency Evaluation, p.7-S.) The second competency 
evaluation, stated it could not rule out primary dementia, and it strongly recommend that 
Mr. Clinton be seen to medicate his possible depression and anxiety. (OS/30/10 
Competency Evaluation, p.S) The evaluator did state that Mr. Clinton's anxiety and 
depression were so severe it could affect his ability to communicate with his trial 
counsel. (10/13/10 Competency Evaluation, p.5.) It does not appear that the 
competency evaluator received Mr. Clinton's medical records and it only received the 
dementia." (Tr., p.53, Ls.1S-19.) On appeal, "[fJindings are clearly erroneous only 
when unsupported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Kinser, 141 Idaho 
557, 560 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing to State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 6S2, 6S6 (Ct. App. 
1999). Idaho appellate courts will overturn a district court's factual findings if they are 
clearly erroneous. (see State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 75 (2000). Since, Mr. Clinton 
did not receive a mental health evaluation there is no evidence in the record that the 
district court was relying on when it made the preceding factual findings they should be 
deemed clearly erroneous and be disregarded. 
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audio and video records of his communication with other third parties. (10/13/10 
Competency Evaluation, p.2.) 
The psychosexual evaluation did not contain any insight into Mr. Clinton's 
possible dementia. In fact, the only collateral information relied on during the 
psychosexual interview were a client screening form and the two competency 
evaluations. (PSI, pp.19-20.) Therefore, there never was a mental health evaluation 
which actually diagnosed the extent of Mr. Clinton's dementia. 
One of the problems with the lack of a mental health evaluation is that the 
sentence is not properly reflective of potential mitigating evidence. Had Mr. Clinton 
received a mental health evaluation, treatment could have been geared toward treating 
both his mental health and his sexual behavior. The district court noted, that Mr. Clinton 
was very dangerous because he had dementia and sexual urges, and that the dementia 
inhibits his treatment.6 (Tr., p.51, L.11 - p.53, L.23.) Moreover, even the first 
competency evaluation noted his dementia needed to be examined because it might be 
treatable. (08/30/10 Competency Evaluation, p.8) The district court sentenced 
Mr. Clinton based on the assumption that his dementia, which was never accurately 
diagnosed, was untreatable.7 This is the very scenario I.C. § 19-2522 was created to 
prevent. In fact, the I.C. § 19-2522(3)(d) requires a mental health report to include "[a] 
consideration of whether treatment is available for the defendant's mental condition, " 
and I.C. § 19-2522(3)(e) "[a]n analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or 
nontreatment." In this case none of this information was before the district court at 
6 As noted in footnote 5, supra, this is the type of factual finding which is not supported 
by sUbstantial and competent evidence, and is, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
7 As noted in footnote 5, supra, this is the type of factual finding which is not supported 
by substantial and competent evidence, and is, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
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sentencing. Therefore, the materials before the district court did not function as an 
adequate substitute for a full I.C. § 19-2522 mental health evaluation. 
In Jockumsen, supra, the issue of whether a district court has a duty to sua 
sponte order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 and I.C.R. 32 was 
directly at issue. In that case, the Mr. Jockumsen was initially deemed incompetent to 
stand trial, but a subsequent evaluation deemed him competent. Jockumsen, 148 
Idaho at 819. "No psychological evaluation was requested or ordered for sentencing 
purposes, but the reports from [Mr. Jockumsen's] competency evaluators were attached 
to the presentence report (PSI)." Id. The competency evaluations were reviewed by 
the PSI investigator and the district court at sentencing. Id. On appeal Mr. Jockumsen 
argued that "the district court erred by failing to sua sponte order a separate mental 
health evaluation for sentencing purposes pursuant to I.C. §19-2522." Id. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that Mr. Jockumsen's mental health was a 
significant factor at sentencing and vacated his sentence. Id. at 823. In coming to that 
conclusion, it was pointed out that Mr. Jockumsen was initially determined to be 
incompetent to stand for trial. Id. Mr. Jockumsen claimed he was diagnosed as 
schizophrenic, but the PSI contained "no information confirming or disproving" the claim. 
Id. At sentencing, the district court said that Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness was going 
to be considered, but it was ambiguous, and that it did not know if the risk 
Mr. Jockumsen posed to the community was a result of his criminal thinking or his 
mental illness. Id. 
The facts of this case are similar to those of Jockumsen, supra. Here, the 
competency evaluator thought Mr. Clinton suffered from dementia, but that was never 
pursued in a mental health evaluation. Unlike Jockumsen, Mr. Clinton's mental health 
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issues were not ambiguous and were regarded and were squarely before the district 
court. In this case, Mr. Clinton's dementia was at the district court's central focus. 
Thus like the court in Jockumsen, the district court erred when it failed to sua sponte 
order an I.C. §19-2522 mental health evaluation for Mr. Clinton. 
In sum, the district court was provided with two competency evaluations that put 
the court on notice that Mr. Clinton might suffer from dementia. However, there was 
never a mental health evaluation ordered to examine that possibility. At sentencing, the 
district court solely focused on Mr. Clinton's possible dementia when it refused his 
request for probation or a period of retained jurisdiction. Because, Mr. Clinton's 
undiagnosed dementia was a significant factor at sentencing, and since there was never 
a I.C. §19-2522 mental health evaluation ordered, the district court acted in manifest 
disregard of I.C.R. 32, which requires the elements of I.C. § 19-2522 be included in the 
PSI when a defendant's mental health is a significant factor at sentencing, and, thus, 
this case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing in which a mental health 
evaluation is ordered. 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of 
Twenty Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Clinton Following His Plea Of Guilty 
To Lewd Conduct With A Minor Under Sixteen 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Clinton was never officially diagnosed with dementia. However, the district 
court used his dementia as an aggravating factor at sentencing. This was in 
contravention of the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548 
(2008), which held that the existence of a mental health issues is to be used as a 
mitigating factor at sentencing. Even though, the question of whether or not 
Mr. Clintons suffers from dementia has not been answered, the district court erred when 
it weighed his mental health as a aggravating factor at sentencing. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of 
Twenty Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Clinton Following His Plea Of 
Guilty To Lewd Conduct With A Minor Under Sixteen 
Mr. Clinton asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
twenty years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979». Mr. Clinton does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
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of discretion, Mr. Clinton must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992)). The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)). 
The district court should have considered Mr. Clinton's possible dementia as a 
mitigating factor at sentencing. In State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 569-70 (2008), the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that even in instances where there is no nexus between a 
crime and the mental health issue(s), mental health evidence is relevant to sentence 
mitigation. Implicit in the foregoing is that the mitigating nature of mental health issues 
should be amplified when there is a nexus between the underlying offense the 
defendant's mental health problems. Here, the district court concluded, without any 
evidence to support its conclusion, that Mr. Clinton's dementia should be a aggravating 
factor because his sexual desires will continue while his dementia will reduce his ability 
to understand his actions. (Tr., p.51, L.11 - p.53, L.23.) Despite this reasoning, Mr. 
Clinton's mental health should have been a mitigating factor because it reduces his 
culpability. 
Additionally, the lack of a mental health evaluation exacerbated the district 
court's error, because Mr. Clinton might be amenable to mental health treatment. 
According to the first competency evaluation: 
Depending on the outcome of a comprehensive neurological evaluation, 
there may in fact be treatment options to improve his cognitive functioning 
and to help move him towards competence to proceed with his legal 
affairs. 
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(08/30/10 Competency Evaluation, p.8.) Had Mr. Clinton's mental health issues been 
fully diagnosed his treatment options could have been explored. Had this occurred, the 
appropriate mental health treatment could reduce the risk he poses to society. If the 
district court's unsupported assertion is correct, i.e. his mental health makes him a 
sexual danger to the community, then the lack of treatment for his mental health is 
inhibiting, not promoting, his rehabilitation. Further, all of the treatment he is receiving 
for his sexual behavior will be futile without treatment for his dementia. 
Additionally, Mr. Clinton is amenable to treatment for his sexual behaviors. 
According to the psychosexual evaluation, Mr. Clinton was deemed amenable to 
treatment for his sexual behaviors. (PSI, p.32.) Mr. Clinton stated that he wanted to 
reinitiate sexual behavior treatment. (PSI, p.28.) The psychosexual evaluator ultimately 
recommended either incarceration or release into the general public. (PSI, p.34.) 
Therefore, Mr. Clinton is amenable to treatment for his sexual behaviors. If Mr. Clinton 
receives dual treatment for both his mental health and his sexual behaviors the risk he 
poses to society would be reduced. 
There are additional mitigating factors which support the conclusion that 
Mr. Clinton's sentence is unduly harsh. Specifically, the support Mr. Clinton receives 
from his friends should be considered as a mitigating factor. In State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that support of family and 
friends were mitigating factors. According to the PSI, Mr. Clinton has a place to live and 
support from his friends. Specifically the PSI noted as follows: 
For the last twenty five (25) years or more Mr. Clinton lived in the Flying H 
Trailer Park. The manager of the park and his wife were Mr. Clinton's 
primary social support. Sondra McMann had Power of Attorney for 
Mr. Clinton and paid his bills. According to the trailer park manager, John 
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McMann, Mr. Clinton was welcome to return. He stated none of the 
neighbors were concerned about Mr. Clinton or feared he might re-offend. 
(PSI, p.10.) If released from custody Mr. Clinton will have significant support from the 
community which will enable him to have stable place to live. This support is so 
significant his friends have been assigned with power of attorney and are using that 
power to help him with financial transactions. Additionally, these friends are managers 
of his trailer park and they do not consider him a threat to society and he is welcome to 
return. Therefore, Mr. Clinton's support from friends should be considered as a 
mitigating factor. 
Additionally, Mr. Clinton has a positive employment background, which is a 
mitigating factor. In State v. Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 161 (Ct. App. 1996), it was 
deemed appropriate to consider a defendant's employment background as a mitigating 
factor. Here, Mr. Clinton has maintained steady employment for 26 years. (PSI, p.7.) 
He was working for the trailer park at the time of his arrest. (PSI, p.7.) Moreover, 
Mr. Clinton did not appear to have financial issues. (PSI, p.32.) This point is further 
evinced by the fact that Mr. Clinton does own his own mobile home. (PSI, p.5.) 
Mr. Clinton's employment background provides further support for the conclusion that 
Mr. Clinton will have a stable environment to go to upon his release from custody. This 
also reduces the risk he poses to society because he will have not have any incentive to 
engage in financially related crimes. 
In sum, Mr. Clinton's mental health should he been considered as a mitigating 
factor. This error was exacerbated by the fact that Mr. Clinton never received a mental 
health evaluation, and therefore, he did not receive the mental health treatment he 
needs to make his sexual behavior treatment effective. When this is taken into 
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consideration with the other mitigating factors it sUbstantiates the contention that 
Mr. Clinton's sentence is excessively harsh. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Clinton respectfully requests that his sentence be vacated and that this case 
be remanded to the district court with instructions to order a mental health evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. Alternatively, Mr. Clinton respectfully requests that this 
court either suspend his sentence and place him on probation or remand this case with 
instructions to place him on a period of retained jurisdiction. 
DATED this 24th day of October, 2011. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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